Summary of the Cyprus Workshop, May 2008

As a result of the presidential elections in the South, there is a  new "final chance". In any case it is a remarkable step towards normalization, because the leadership on both sides is free of any dark past. Both sides - new as well - have a serious intention of normalization.

If it were only a personal changeover, the chances would still be low. But at the same time, both the internal and international situations have changed a lot. Despite official lip service, several political forces inside and outside of Cyprus de facto prefer the status quo, or two states. The delicate structure of the Cyprus EC-membership cannot, in the long term, refuse a special status to the northern region within the EC. Seen from this angle, the former argumentation was correct. The admission of the Republic of Cyprus into the EC helped the process of normalization of Cyprus. Hardliners in the South - clear to everybody before - used the membership to increase pressure on the North. As a result, the northern region is more and more treated on an equal basis, which can be seen as a precondition for a lasting solution - a situation,  which did not exist before, not even during the times of the Annan-plan. Maybe today the South is more willing to compromise, because international developments do favour some kind of independence of the North.

The EC knows a lot of exceptions and special arrangements, so it would actually be possible to integrate the northern region even without unification. What terms will finally be employed is of secondary importance. Even the so-called horror scenario of "the Kosovo-case" would have several advantages for the citizens of the South.  For a century, a wedge has been driven between the two communities, and within the last decades they have drifted ever further apart. For instance, the majority will find it hard to believe that a minister of education "belonging to the other side" will push through dramatic changes in the contents of schoolbooks. The European potentialities "in a roundabout way" are still the best option. A subnational arrangement of several steps within the already existing frame of the EC can be an alternative to hasty solutions. Both communities need to start together, all sides (including the EC, Greece, GB and Turkey) have something to offer, which in the end will be to their own advantage. There are foreign bases on Cyprus, closed harbours, unused wasteland, as well as an embargo, - all of this is in contradiction to those who really wish for change. The fundamental subliminal distrust on both sides really becomes apparent in these factors. Taking this into account, every step of rapprochement has to be carefully thought out.